The Gloriagate Scandal and the Impulses of Our Political Classes
Melay V. Abao
Deputy Director
Institute for Popular Democracy
I am convinced that the taped conversations between GMA and Commissioner Garcillano actually took place. I have read the transcripts and listened to the tapes several times. Only GMA has that unique, annoying, irritating voice. Moreover, GMA's silence (read: dedma) has strengthened my conviction. It is obvious that she is "neutralizing" the situation and evidently, she – starting with the Bunye press conference -- is simply muddling through. Because of this I have joined the RIO (resign-impeach-oust)-GMA fray but I always tell myself: this time, it should be more than just replacing a president.
In other words, I no longer bother with the question "did she or didn't she"? (As I said, I am convinced that she did.) In my opinion, the more important question now is this: How could we have allowed something so horrendous as election rigging at the highest level to happen in our country? I have, infact, been very aghast at the pronouncement of prominent Edsa 1 and 2 personalities such as former COMELEC Commissioner Christian Monsod and Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J that the conversation between GMA and Garcillano may be improper but not necessarily illegal – as if impropriety of this kind (i.e meddling with people's "consent") were a lesser crime than violating a wire-tapping law!
Why, indeed, do political "improprieties" such as the Gloriagate scandal continue to happen? The answer lies not only in GMA who has turned out to be so bad at being a trapo ( i.e all other trapos cheat during elections but only GMA has been reckless enough to get caught). We also need to look into the different political classes in our society, their impulses and interaction to understand why it is possible for a presidential candidate and a COMELEC commissioner to "fix" elections even after two decades of formal democracy and three people power exercises.
For political activists, analysing the gloriagate scandal with some structural/class perspective sheds light on what lies underneath and beyond the RIO calls. It is important to situate this political moment in the various "impulses" of different political classes in our society -- the various sections that affect our politics -- so we do not blind ourselves to all the possibilities and limits of anti-GMA calls.
The impulses of the different classes in our society have been most visible during major political moments such as Edsa 1, 2, 3 and during elections. Although current apathy especially among the middle class can be explained by people's desperation over the lack of change despite the 3 Edsas, we need to recognize that these exercises revealed what Prof. Randy David calls "revolutionary impulses". As political activists, we have to be observant and critical of the impulses that have found expression in the past and those that continue to exist among various sections. We need to always ask what and who is "out there".
Right now, in the initial stages of the Gloriagate scandal it is the dominant political class, with their wheeling-and-dealing-impulse, that is at work. The "critical mass" is still not visible and might, infact, be difficult to mobilize simply because their current impulse is to "leave" (literally) rather than to "raise voice". Nevertheless, the fact remains that the support of this critical mass will be crucial to end the current "stalemate" (to borrow Joel Rocamora's term) between the ruling elite, the elite opposition and the Left opposition. This critical mass -- defined here as "the show of force and unity of politically active citizens" -- can tip the balance of forces. If this critical mass does not step in ( i.e stay instead of leave), only the coup d'etat and back-to-martial-law-rule options will be available.
The more important 'structural' problem, I think, is this: our country's critical mass tend to disappear in-between elections and in-between people power episodes. What we now have is a crisis of our representative institutions aggravated by the absence of incentives and channels for direct political participation especially of the middle class. The Gloriagate scandal is yet another reminder of how much we have left our politics in the hands of the political elite. Ousting Gloria without changing this political elite is not going to produce lasting changes in our political system.
Socio-Economic Classification of the Politically Active
"Political classes" cannot be determined without considering the socio-economic standing of those who are politically active. This article is not an attempt at classifying class in strict Marxist terms, rather, at categorizing sections of society for purposes of analysing their political impulses. The "class analysis" presented here is derived from classifications of survey firms because these were the nearest I could get to some "scientific" categorization of political classes.
Survey firms such as SWS and Pulse Asia often classify Filipinos into five (5) socio-economic classes -- A, B, C, D, E -- using seven (7) variables: durability of the house, maintenance of the house, neighborhood, education of the household head, occupation of the household head, facilities found in the house and income of the household. (Note: features described below are those of the survey firms).
Class A are the richest with household income of over 100,000 PhP monthly. They live in permanent homes built with high quality materials that are located in exclusive neighborhoods. They are graduates of expensive colleges and occupy top positions in moderate to big businesses. They have more than 10 facilities (or appliances) and have new cars (not more than 5 years old).
Class B are similar to Class A in almost all features but their household income range from 50,000-100,000 PhP monthly.
Class C have household income between 15,000 – 50,000 PhP monthly. Unlike Class A and B, they live in semi-permanent homes (with good quality materials) in mixed neighborhoods of large and small houses. Household heads are graduates of state colleges or have attained some college education. They are often junior executives, young professionals or middle level supervisors. Their homes have 5-10 facilities and they own, at most, one vehicle.
Class D live in poorly constructed, semi-permanent homes which are generally unpainted and badly in need of repair. Household heads are high school graduates or have attained some highschool education. They are lowly paid, white collar workers or skilled workers, lowland farmers, tenants, foremen, unskilled overseas workers or may have a small business. Their homes have 2-4 facilities. They earn 8,000 – 15,000 PhP monthly.
Class E are the poorest. They live in temporary structures which are unpainted and dilapidated; their homes are located in slum districts. Household heads are often elementary graduates (or have not graduated at all). They are the farmhands, unskilled workers, vendors, non-permanent workers, non-regular wage earners and often engage in odd jobs such as plumbing, repairs, masonry. Their homes have none or only 1 facility. Their household income is below 8,000 PhP.
Although the survey firms do not use "upper-middle-lower class" classifications, for the purposes of this article, the following class categories will be used: Class A and B are the "upper class", Class C are the "middle class", Class Dare the "working poor", and Class E are the "poorest of the poor".
Based on the foregoing socio-economic categorization and an extrapolation of the SWS 2004 exit poll (I asked IPD statistician Nikken Beronilla to do some calculating), this much can be gathered: Class A and B, the "upper class"comprise 1.7% of voters, Class C comprise 6.3%, Class D comprise 63.2%, and, Class E comprise 28.8%.
In the SWS 2004 exit poll, class D is further divided into 3 sub-classes with class D1 "owning housing lots" and this section comprises 38.9% of voters. Thus, with this section combined with Class C, the "middle class" comprise 45.2% of voters(6.3%+38.9%). Class D, the "working poor"comprise 24.3% of voters and Class E, the "poorest of the poor" comprise 28.8% of voters.
The SWS 2004 exit poll and its correlation with the socio-economic classification is a useful indicator of "political classes" because it is safe to assume that (actual) "voters" are those who are "politically active".
The Dominant Political Class: Wheeling and Dealing
In any major political moment - as in the Gloriagate scandal and the 2001 Erap jueteng scandal -- the political elite is always the most visible political class. These scandals, after all, are often embedded in the interaction of warring factions of the elite, in their "wheeling and dealing". To seize power, factions must dig up "dirt" and he/she who throws the most dirt ends up the winner.
The political elite is not always the source of dirt that may eventually lead to the ouster of Philippine presidents. In 2001, it was PCIJ, a group of formidable journalists who first exposed Erap's unexplained wealth. The political elite immediately upstaged these journalists, however, because they (the elite) were able to shape public opinion by virtue of their ownership of media outlets, especially broadcast media. In the Gloriagate scandal, it is interesting to note that the major television networks are seemingly taking the "wait and see" position – very much like the Makati Business Club position. Their reluctance to air the gloria-garcillano tapes may be about protecting business interests rather than complying with the legal rules (against using wire-tapped tapes). These media giants know that they have replaced political parties in informing citizens about political developments. They too have become part of the political elite and therefore want to be sure that they align with winners in the political game.
Analysing media giants is important because these institutions have direct access to the middle and lower classes, to the potential critical mass. While they need to be transformed as well, media institutions can be valuable sources of lessons in mobilizing people. The Erap ouster, for instance, could not have been possible without the TV coverage of the impeachment process, of that "open-the-envelope" moment. Political movements, especially the progressive movement, have much to learn from mainstream media especially in presenting political messages to the general public.
The other section of the political elite is big business. It is not difficult to see why this is so: Philippine politics is essentially about money politics. Business people actively involve themselves in partisan politics because they care about how their money is spent, i.e that it is spent on politicians and political activities that will ensure even greater profits for their business ventures.
The Church is another matter altogether. Although there is a state-church divide, the Philippine Church, especially the Catholic Church hierarchy, is very influential in using religious values as mobilizing factors. The Church may not be part of the political elite in the strict, technical sense but it is certainly in the midst of political wheeling and dealing. We see this in the silence of some Catholic Church leaders, in El Shaddai leader Mike Velarde who has already held GMA's hand, and, in Jesus-is-Lord and Inglesia ni Kristo leaders who seem to be straddling still between the ruling elite and the elite opposition.
Finally, there is that mainstream pool of traditional politicians and political parties whose fragmentation is highly obvious in the Gloriagate scandal. With the impending investigation of the controversial tapes in Congress, the elite opposition now present themselves as stalwarts of honest governance. It doesn't matter that these holier-than-thou Kongresistas have not passed a single piece of major legislation pertinent to electoral reform and that it is that very same, unchanged electoral system that has allowed a Gloriagate to happen.
It doesn't seem to matter either that Congressman Gilbert Remulla (head of the Congress investigation) comes from the Nationalista Party whose leaders and allies include Senator Villar whose sights are set on the Presidency and Vice-President Noli de Castro who, as Vice-President, and for now, can't say that he wants the Presidency (even trapos want to appear decent).
Moreover, this political elite works closely with (or sometimes overlaps with) the "underworld" of this country. At this time of crisis when the "Erap" option is again surfacing, we need to remember that Erap's ouster was also about stopping crooks and gambling lords – the gangsters – from having a direct hand in governing our country.
This political elite – both the ruling elite and the elite opposition – are all biding for time. Those from within GMA's camp (e.g the Liberal Party) are now pressuring her to at least say something (anything) because such pronouncement is important for them to calculate their next moves. The opposition, meanwhile, is not likely to unify all of a sudden despite their common aspiration to unseat GMA. They too are "waiting" (especially Senator Ping Lacson).
The political elite is again dominant in this unfolding political game. They are only 1.7% of the voters but they are strongest of us all. In purely economic terms, this "upper class" comprise roughly 12% of the entire population. They are the minority but that is why they are elite -- they are the very few people who can buy votes, politicians, political decisions and electoral machines. They are not the "forces of modernity" that some analysts say are much needed now, rather, they are the "forces of continuity" -- the continuity of feudal-like relations in our political system.
The Critical Mass: Exit vs.Voice
I agree with Joel Rocamora that there is now a stalemate. Both the ruling elite and the elite opposition are weak because they have no regular political bases to begin with. They have paid supporters every election and every mobilization but they do not have that faithful following. This explains why many a Philippine President (especially former President Ramos) rely heavily on the military as a political base and on shifting social-political bases.
For one section of the political elite to be hegemonic in major political moments, support of a "critical mass" is the defining element. All of the EDSAs have proven this. This is not to say that those who joined the EDSAs are blind supporters, rather, that their sensibilities ( i.e anti-dictatorship, anti-corruption, anti-dishonesty) have been utilized by the political elite for vested interests.
For the political elite, thus, the most important question is "who" will actually force GMA to go and "who" will fight for her to stay. The elite's schism is underpinned by their conflicting reading of this potential support base and strategies to gain such support. Evidently, it is this same reading of the "who" that divides the Left. Those calling for immediate revolutionary change believe there is a revolutionary situation and that the "who" (those for GMA's removal)only need to be nudged. Others are less deterministic, preferring to engage in the political landscape with nary an assumption or a conclusion that the revolutionary situation is "it" and that revolutionary change is "now". Finally, there are those in the Left who are too cautious about rocking the boat even further (for good reason -- some are them are still in the boat!).
I think I belong to the "less deterministic but want to rock the boat" bunch. I am all for revolutionary change but I do not believe a revolutionary situation exists and that radical change will happen even with GMA out of the picture. This position is based on a reading of the critical mass which remains a mere "potential" several weeks into the tape expose.
The SWS figures shown above point to the reality that this potential critical mass can come from roughly 98% of the voting population (or 88% of the population, in socio-economic terms): classes C, D, and E – the middle class, the working poor and the poorest of the poor. In Edsa 1 and 2, the middle class and the working poor were the most prominent. In Edsa 3, the working poor and the poorest took center stage.
In my opinion, an Edsa 4 is not likely to happen – especially not right now -- because the middle and lower classes are preoccupied with fending for themselves.
The middle class, in particular, is an interesting case in point. My sense is that this class wants to leave rather than raise voice. They have no incentives to stay and actively participate in our politics. Many, infact, have already left. Around 7.5 - 8.5 million Filipinos are now working in 197 countries. Everyday, an estimated 2,500 Filipinos leave the country to find work abroad (for more details, please see the website of the Center for Migrant Advocacy-Philippines). This means that since the May 2004 elections, more than 900,000 Filipinos who are likely to have been politically active are no longer around.
My answer thus to Randy David's question (in Public Conversations, PDI, June 19, 2005) as to "why the public is not reacting with outrage to the scandal of the Garci tapes" is simply that this public may not even be around anymore. Those still around also want to leave.
It is because of this reading of the middle class that I am skeptical of the Left's belief that a revolutionary situation does or can exist because of the Gloriagate scandal. I have, infact, serious problems with the political attitude of some Left groups toward the middle class: that this class is needed but only the masses (working class) are "revolutionary"; that it is "elitist" to consider the middle class as a potent force for revolutionary change.
I share the opinion of those who believe that the middle class are the forces of modernity. The initial impulse of this class, infact, has been to turn to modern technology -- text jokes, internet exchanges -- to express disgust, disbelief and disrespect for GMA, the politicians, the Left, and, their ongoing political intramurals. Without this class in the political landscape, without incentives and regular channels for their direct participation, this Gloriagate scandal -- with or without the eventual removal of GMA -- will simply be another political moment that too, will pass away.
Communist or socialist calls are not likely to be the cutting edge in the unfolding landscape. If the middle and lower classes are to matter significantly, the call now should be more basic: Stay. Don't leave the country. Don't leave our politics to politicians.
