Inquirer Editorial

Editorial : Join the issue

July 30, 2005
Inquirer News Service

IS there an ideal time to amend the Constitution? The way opposition leaders have spoken out against the very notion of a "great debate" on Charter change, one would think that the answer is a categorical Yes. The real answer, however, is more complicated than the opposition makes it seem.

If in fact the ideal conditions were met -- let's assume these include the lack of economic uncertainty, the lack of a political crisis, and the lack of a leadership suspected of hiding ulterior motives -- the drive to improve the Constitution would itself lose momentum. The reason is elementary: If the system can give rise to such conditions in the first place, why fix it?

Not that anything resembling an ideal state of conditions would ever be reached. Constitutional change will always have economic costs or depend on political trade-offs; there will always be some kind of economic or political constraints. Not least, the entire political class, not just its leadership, will always be suspected of acting out of self-interest.

The argument that we should postpone the debate on Constitutional amendments to better times, therefore, has more leaks than the Titanic. There are no ideal conditions for Charter change.

By definition, pressure for a constitutional amendment reflects an existing problem in the constitutional order. The more severe the problem, the more acute the pressure.

Has the country come to such a pass? The most discussed options for dealing with today's political crisis -- from a revolutionary government to impeachment-plus-a-Truth-Commission -- suggest that such a problem already exists. At the very least, the number of Filipinos who may be willing to try something other than business-as-usual implies that there is, in fact, a constituency for Charter change.

But the opposition's real argument is more immediate: The debate on Charter change is part of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's strategy to hold on to power: to avoid impeachment by complicating the work of Congress, to forestall resignation by designing a so-called graceful exit.

In this view, to take part in the debate would be to play the President's game; it would be to play the role of an accomplice in a new crime, that of the mother of all cover-ups.

To which we can only say: The opposition should try less drama and more imagination.

Yes, Charter change can be a trap, in the exact same way that the impeachment process can be a trap too: that is, if anti-Arroyo lawmakers see themselves as mice rather than men.

The "terrible sword" of impeachment is deliberately unwieldy; it was designed to be unsheathed only with difficulty. That it is difficult to use is not an excuse for the minority to avoid it; in fact, the constitutional provisions on impeachment specifically allow the minority to override the majority. As the case of President Joseph Estrada in November 2000 proved, the numbers game could be a trap for the majority too.

Charter change will perhaps be an even more complicated process. Senate resistance to any fast-tracking of constitutional amendments is formidable; but as the Estrada impeachment case also proved, public pressure and the weight of evidence can turn any numbers game around.

That is the rationale behind the President's so-called media blitz. This permanent campaign has been received only as an attempt to make over Ms Arroyo's image and raise her survey ratings. But it is also an initiative to make the case for Charter change.

The fact that Charter change is now the topic of discussion in many parts of the country is proof of the presidency's power to set the national agenda. The President's bully pulpit may have sustained some damage in the last two months, but it is still largely intact.

It is incumbent on the opposition, therefore, to take part in the discussion. Engagement is the only way they can influence the agenda or prevent the President from monopolizing it.

If they refuse to do the necessary work-of educating the public, for instance, that federalism does not necessarily require a parliamentary form of government or that a parliamentary system does not need to be unicameral-they will effectively be ceding the battleground to the President.